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Policy failures are in a sense inevitable. That is, if a policy developed to deal with a specific 
problem or issue is left in place long enough it is highly likely that over time the environment 
or problem context will shift enough that the policy will become obsolete or irrelevant and 
like a hulk adrift on the ocean, may do more harm than good simply being left in place. This 
phenomenon of a necessary linkage between a policy and its context and the need for content 
to be continually updated to deal with changes in context has been noted in recent work by 
Baumgartner and Jones and Lejano and Shankar, among others. However these works have 
not distinguished between types of policy contexts and the extent of the need for updating or, 
to put it another way, the extent to which it is likely that a policy will become obsolete and the 
according need to design a policy to be adaptive right at the outset of policy creation. This 
paper addresses this issue, examining the concepts of ambiguity and ‘deep uncertainty’ 
developed by Walker and his colleagues and applying these to considerations of policy 
failure and the means to overcome them. 
 
 
Introduction: The Inevitability of Policy Failure Over Time 
As Callander (2011) has noted, at the best of times ―policy making is hard‖. That is, even in 
the best of circumstances policy-makers have imperfect knowledge and are faced with many 
constraints in the efforts to craft government actions to address real or imagined problems 
and issues. Moreover, in most governmental systems they also face almost certain 
punishment for their failures of both omission and commission yet earn few lasting benefits 
or entitlements from achieving the success expected of them (Howlett 2012). As a result it 
should not be surprising that they often react in a very conservative or status quo fashion 
when faced with new challenges (Howlett 2014).  
 However it is also the case that governments cannot hide from problems forever and 
that in some specific circumstances, such as electoral campaigns or career-building efforts, do 
favor action over inaction and ‗positive‘ action over ‗negative‘ problem denial or attacks on 
their detractors and problem formulators (Howlett 2014; Saward 1992). In such 
circumstances, as Hood (2002; 2010) and others have noted, it is important that policy-
makers correctly evaluate the risks of failure. This is both in order to avoid blame in the 
future which might rebound upon them if they claimed credit for resolving an issue in the 
present (Twight 1991) but also, and more importantly in many circumstances, in order to 
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ensure that a policy deals with an issue effectively not just in the short-term but also the long 
run (Jacobs 2008). 
 This long-term orientation and dimension of political success and failure is an element 
of policy-making which has been largely ignored or explained away as irrelevant, with many 
observers citing the short-term horizons attributed to policy-makers, especially the electoral 
ones attributed to political ones (Ullen 1990; Warwick 2000) as powerful enough to 
overcome any long-term orientation they might desire. However many policy-makers are not 
politicians – such as administrators and managers – and are concerned about long-term 
reputations or the public good rather than electoral advantage. Against the assumption of 
short-term influences promoted in the media and by pundits around the globe, as Jacobs 
(2011) noted, long-term policy making is in fact the norm in many areas ranging from social 
security and pension policy to natural resource and environmental management. Such 
behaviour reveals a pattern of risk management activity much different from those enamored 
of explanations which focus only upon short term electoral dynamics (see also Majone 2010; 
Reimer 2010). 
 Designing for the long term, however, is a vexing problem for policy designers since, 
over time, it is likely that any policy simply left in place will fail. That is, ceteris paribus, if a 
policy developed to deal with a specific problem or issue is left in place long enough it is 
highly likely that over time its environment or problem context will shift enough that the 
policy will become obsolete or irrelevant and like a hulk adrift on the ocean, may do more 
harm than good simply being left in place. This phenomenon of a necessary linkage between 
a policy and its context and the need for content to be continually updated to deal with 
changes in context has been noted in recent work by Baumgartner and Jones (Jones and 
Baumgartner 2012) and Lejano and Shankar (2012), among others. However these works 
have not distinguished between types of policy contexts and the extent of the need for 
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updating or, to put it another way, the extent to which it is likely that a policy will become 
obsolete and the according need to design a policy to be adaptive right at the outset of policy 
creation.  
This paper addresses this issue, examining the concepts of ambiguity and ‗deep 
uncertainty‘ developed by Walker and his colleagues (Walker et al 2012) and applying this to 
considerations of policy failure and the means to overcome them. In this view, policies must 
be designed with their problem contexts in mind and those that are unable to function 
effectively under dynamic and uncertain conditions are often unable to achieve their intended 
goals and can also impede the ability of societies to adapt to the changing conditions 
(Swanson and Bhadwal, 2009).  
A critical challenge that policy-makers face in all situations is responding to a 
problem under conditions of uncertainty (Simon 1991; Morgan and Henrion 1990; Swanson 
et al, 2010). Given this uncertainty there is a need to identify policy responses to help policies 
effectively ‗adapt‘ to match the rate and level of projected change in their environments. 
Decision making under a high degree of uncertainty hence should result in polices flexible 
enough to accommodate conditions of change and robust enough to withstand multiple 
scenarios in the future, in order to enable decisions to withstand long-term change (WRR, 
2011). 
 
Dealing with the Inevitability of Failure: Considerations of Ambiguity and Uncertainty 
But not all environments change as rapidly as others and not all uncertainties demand the 
same response. Failing to correctly identify the bounds and range of these uncertainties is a 
major cause of policy over and under-reaction (Maor  2012a and 2012b) - or over and under-
design - and these elements of the risk environment must be correctly understood and 
diagnosed by policy-makers in specific circumstances if policy failures are to be avoided 




Contrasting Epistemic and Ontological Uncertainty: The Need for Better Classifications 
 
The concept of uncertainty has been widely interpreted and studied in diverse disciplines that 
influence public policy including the physical sciences, social sciences, mathematical 
sciences, engineering, economics, philosophy and psychology (Walker et al, 2012). Dealing 
with long-term policy-making and its design, however, requires a better classification of the 
different types of uncertainty policy-makers and policies face than is provided in most of 
these fields. 
Simply classifying uncertainty as that aspect of knowledge whose probability is 
unknown, for example, makes it difficult to proceed with ‗real-world decision-making‘ 
(Morgan and Henrion 1990). A key distinction drawn in the economics and finance literature 
– which derives from the work of Knight (1921) – is useful in moving beyond this simple 
idea. This involves distinguishing between the uncertain future in which uncertainty is 
represented by known probability distributions (―Knightian risk‖) and that in which 
distributions themselves are unknown (―Knightian uncertainty‖). In their well-known volume 
on uncertainty and policy-making, Morgan and Henrion (1990) develop this insight and 
difference in presenting an uncertainty classification for quantitative policy and risk analysis 
models based on whether the uncertainties arise from the empirical quantities and variables 
used in these models or are inherent in the form and structure of these models.  
As they note, uncertainty in parameter estimates of models can arise from many sources. 
These include such origins as statistical variation owing to random measurement errors, 
―linguistic imprecision‖ in the case of quantities that are not well-specified and are different 
to be empirically measured, variations over time and space, randomness, subjective 
judgment, marking the difference between the true and expected value of the quantity, 
disagreement between experts, and/or differences between the real and approximated value of 
a quantity of goods or services over time.
1
 Uncertainties which extend beyond the model 
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parameter variability, however, represent a further distinct genus of uncertainty which is 
more profound and much harder to deal with (see Figure 1). Uncertainty can thus be 
knowledge–related (epistemic) due to incomplete information availability on system 
parameters; related to inherent variability and unpredictability of the system itself (physical 
system, human behavior, technological advancement, ―surprise‖ etc.) (Walker et al, 2003); or 
ontological i.e. due to the ―simultaneous presence of multiple frames of reference about a 
system among different actors‖ (Kwakkel et al, 2010).   
 
Figure 1: Uncertainty classification for policy and risk analysis (Morgan and Henrion, 1990) 
 
 
The distinction between epistemic uncertainty arising due to incomplete, inadequate 
or complete lack of information on one hand and ontological uncertainty has been brought 
out more evidently in classifications which followed Morgan and Henrion‘s. Schrader et al 
(1993), for example, differentiates ―uncertainty‖, or a lack of information on the variables of 
interest from ―ambiguity‖, a state in which there is a ‗lack of clarity‘ on the variables 
themselves and their functional relationships (see Figure 2).  
Although sometimes elided,  (epistemic) uncertainty and (ontological) ambiguity are 






Figure 2: The Uncertainty- Ambiguity Matrix (Schrader et al, 1993) 
 
Brugnach et al (2008) have continued to develop this ‗ambiguity-uncertainty‘ distinction. 
They present ambiguity as a relation that involves an object(s) of perception or knowledge 
which various actors share about the nature of future states of being (ontological). They 
consider this kind of ambiguity as uncertainty of ‗a third kind‘ apart from the first type of 





The Notion of Deep Uncertainty and Its Policy Consequences 
The more recent uncertainty classifications developed by scholars such as Walker et 
al (2003), Kwakkel et al (2010) and Walker et al (2010) utilize these insights into the 
differences between different types of uncertainty to develop a theory of policy design for 
dealing with ambiguity or ―deep uncertainty‖ over the long-term.  
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Like Morgan and Henrion these authors focus on both epistemic and ontological 
uncertainty in policy decisions and classify these policy contexts according to the location 
and level of uncertainty they involve. Here they distinguish between the ‗location‘ of 
uncertainty; that is, where uncertainty occurs, including at the boundaries of the system, in 
the conceptual policy model or a computer-based model, in model implementation, or with 
input and output data. More significant, however, is their notion of ―levels of uncertainty‖ 
which they argue range from that of complete determinism about the system being studied 
when all possible knowledge is comprehended (all ―known-knowns‖) to total ignorance (all 
―unknown unknowns‖) (Walker et al, 2010; Becker and Brownsen 1964) (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 – Knowledge and Comprehension Matrix 
 
 
On this spectrum Walker et al (2010) include Level 1 (shallow) uncertainty – where multiple 
alternative states representing the system with specific probabilities are present; Level 2 
(medium) uncertainty – where multiple alternatives can be ranked based on ‗perceived 
likelihood‘ of their occurrence are present; Level 3 (deep) uncertainty- where multiple 
alternatives are present but these cannot be ranked in terms of their likelihood of occurrence; 
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and Level 4 complete ignorance – where there is the inability to present any realistic 
alternatives (see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: Levels of uncertainty (Walker et al, 2010) 
 
One of the other of these scenarios will characterizes the problem environment of a policy 
and a common source of failure is the mischaracterization of uncertainty and especially the 
mistake of failing to appreciate the difference between uncertainty and ambiguity in policy 
design efforts. 
 
The Policy Relevance of Uncertainty 
Different policy problem environments correspond to these different levels of 
uncertainty and their propensity to fail over time and their appropriate policy treatment vary 
accordingly. Policy problems characterized Level I uncertainty, for example, are at least in 
theory not very difficult problems at all and ones very likely to be resolved by standard 
treatments. Hence, for example, controlling a housing market though interest (mortgage) rate 
10 
 
manipulation is a well known treatment for either encouraging or discouraging building and 
offers only a very limited range or space for failure – such as not setting the interest rate level 
high (or low) enough. Level II uncertainty is only slightly more complex and may have some 
unexpected results – such as when tobacco price hikes run into problems with smuggling and 
black markets – which are more difficult to predict and control but are neither completely 
unexpected nor surprising when they occur. 
Level III problems featuring deep uncertainty however, are much more complex as 
the ratio of ambiguity to uncertainty is much higher. In these cases, such as when transport 
planners try to increase the number of walkers and cyclist at the expense of car drivers, the 
number of possible tools and scenarios climbs dramatically and thus, ceteris paribus, so do 
the chances of failure of any single initiative of policy package or set of measures (Taeihagh 
et al 2013). Conventional forecasting methods such as Monte Carlo simulations and 
quantitative methods using statistical analyses are not adequately equipped to deal with 
situations of ‗deep uncertainty‘ (Walker et al 2010, Brugnach et al 2008). In these cases there 
is little agreement on the choice of models to characterize a system‘s variables and their 
interactions and assign likely probability distributions (McInerney et al 2011), and/or value 
diverse possible future outcomes (Walker et al 2010).
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Finally there are Level IV problems in which the level of both known unknowns and 
unknown unknowns is much higher and effective decision-making almost if not wholly 
impossible. Climate change is one such problem with multiple perspectives regarding the 
issue as well as potential solutions. Uncertainty in climate assessments can emerge owing to 
lack of data or lack of agreement on results, statistical methods, error of measurement, use of 
approximations, subjectivity in judgment, uncertainty in human behavior, errors in model 
structure, errors in values of parameters, likelihood of change in parameters from historical 
values, differences in concepts and terminology, choice of spatial/ temporal units, 
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assumptions taken etc. Additionally, climate change is a global phenomenon with local 
impacts, and there is a time delay when these impacts are manifested.  
 
Policy Failure under Uncertainty: The Need for Adaptive Policies 
Day and Klein (1989) suggest that most government policies are crafted in response 
to events that are ‗reasonably predictable.‘ Most of the research in the engineering, social, 
and natural sciences has assumed that uncertainties emerge owing to a lack of information or 
random variability, thus triggering the quest for information generation and processing, and 
heavy reliance on stochastic methods and statistical analysis. But with rising degrees of 
uncertainty, even with this effort the level of knowledge about the future states of a policy 
environment decreases and this can alter the suitability of policy solutions to address specific 
policy problems.  
Ambiguity and ‗deep uncertainty‘ are central features of many significant policy 
issues and policy-makers engage with such issues  at their peril (Howlett 2014). A faulty 
policy design owing to an incorrect appreciation of the degree or level of uncertainty 
characteristic of a problem can further impede the effective functioning of policies and 
realization of intended policy goals and objectives (Swanson and Bhadwal, 2009).
5
 Thus, 
even policy solutions designed in response to a ‗most likely future‘ scenario or a limited 
range of plausible futures (―robust policies‖) can result in policy failure if the degree of 
uncertainty involved in them is misdiagnosed (Walker et al, 2013; Hallegatte et al 2012).  
Even an assumption of ‗no-harm‘ or ‗no-regret‘ nature of certain policy choices in the 
short-term can mask their adverse (sometimes irreversible) effects in the long-run and thus 
delay timely preventive action. This is because in such issue areas, uncertainty can gather and 
often be magnified through a ―cascade of uncertainty‖ or an uncertainty explosion‖ 
(Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, see Figure 5), which refers to the process whereby 
uncertainty gradually accumulates in the course of developing future projections of a 
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phenomenon and its possible impacts. The cascade also implies that in a causal chain the 
characteristics of the aggregate distribution of outcomes might be very different over time.  
 
 




In such contexts policy events will often appear to be unpredictable, ‗unforeseen‘ and 
‗unprojectable‘; catastrophic; or ones where interpretation of uncertainty signals is 
convoluted because of associated moral and social issues. Unexpected events or ‗wild-cards‘ 
(Wardekker et al 2010) that can impact policymaking with significant social and political 
implications will be more frequent. And a significant challenge for policymakers in such 
cases is that such events offer little or no scope for the decision-maker to respond from 
history or experience (Walker et al 2010, Lempert et al 2003), although they may often be 
able to respond by analogy (Hood 1986). 
Taking the specific example of climate change, Smith et al 2010 argue that current 
decision-making on adapting to the impacts of climate change focuses on ‗adjustments‘ to 
current activities and the possibility of a potential transformation in social and political 
regimes largely remains unaddressed (Pelling 2010, Smith et al. 2010). While much of the 
effort towards reduction of uncertainty has focused on gathering more information and 
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addressing gaps in knowledge, this step by itself has found to be inadequate in ensuring the 
development of a ‗good‘ policy design under uncertainty.  
While such issues might have once been termed a ‗wicked problem‘ (Rittel and 
Weber, 1973) in the sense that both the problem cause and solution are unknown, they are 
much more serious than that. Levin et al (2012), for example, argue that climate change is in 
fact in a special class of ‗super-wicked problems‘ because as any action towards addressing 
climate change delays, the problem gets further difficult to solve; secondly, those responsible 
for causing the problem and who possess the means to solve it, lack any clear incentive to do 
so in practice; and thirdly, because a legal institutional framework to address the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of this issue is lacking. Many of the current climate plans and policies 
are not designed to undertake transformative changes in the future and therefore are unlikely 
to be able to adequately deal with the high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity which are a 
feature of this problem context. In such circumstances policy-makers may opt to do little if 
anything and such inaction may cause a failure cascade which will be much more difficult to 
correct in the future  (Howlett 2014). 
This is not necessarily a completely bleak prognosis for a future composed of 
continual large-scale policy failure, however. Rather it should be highlighted that, over time, 
most of the serious planning problems posed by deep uncertainties at present may be reduced. 
That is, as the future approaches, by definition, it becomes more like the present and hence 
better known. And a strategy of policy design focused on adaptation over time is well suited 
to dealing with Level III and Level IV uncertainty. 
 
Crafting Adaptive Policies 
The concept of being prepared to deal with ‗surprise‘ or unexpected changes has 
largely been used in the ecological context (Lindenmayer et al. 2010) but also applies to 
policy-making. The European Environment Agency (2001) report on long-term policies, for 
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example, repeatedly emphasized the importance of building into policies various processes to 
recognize early warnings of changes in policy environments, especially as new knowledge 
emerges.  
The focus of policy design under uncertainty has typically been one geared to dealing 
with uncertainty but not ambiguity: to reduce uncertainty where possible, or in other cases, 
assess the range of uncertainty and then identify policy measures that are expected to be 
‗robust‘ within this range (Bredenhoff-Bijlsma, R., 2010). Policies need to be ‗adaptive‘ 
(adapt to changes over time), however, if they are to ‗sustain‘, that is,  survive under 
conditions of change in which the environment in which the policies are deployed and 
operate is of a Level III or IV type (Walker et al, 2013). The concept of ―adaptive 
policymaking” has received much attention in the last decade as a useful approach to dealing 
with very high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, 
Hallegatte et al (2012), for example, have argued in the case of climate change policy 
that it is difficult to define a ―best solution‖ given climate change uncertainties, and instead 
suggest that ―a menu of methodologies‖ is needed, together with some indications on which 
strategies are most appropriate in which contexts.  While maintaining the status quo is an 
option, lack of action may eventually prove fatal in this cases. Augusdinata (2008), in a more 
comprehensive analysis, has argued that in general five possible policy responses are 
available to governments dealing with long-term uncertainties. These include doing nothing – 
that is, enacting no new policy until the impending uncertainty is resolved; instituting a 
delaying policy – that is, maintaining the status quo while efforts are made to reduce or better 
characterize uncertainty by gaining more knowledge; attempting an ‗optimal‘ policy 
approach – that is, using ‗best estimate‘ or best guess models to choose an ‗optimal‘ policy; 
adopting a static robust policy approach – that is, adopting a policy that performs ‗reasonably 
well‘ across most likely plausible future scenarios; or taking an adaptive policy approach – 
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that is, involving plans right from the outset to adapt the policy over time as conditions 
change and learning takes place.  
Similar to Augusdinata (2008), Walker et al (2013) have highlighted four ways 
(overlapping to some extent) in which policies and plans can address different levels of 
uncertainty. These include planning for the worst case scenario - which is likely to be 
expensive and not adequately equipped to deal with ‗surprise‘; aiming at resilience – that is, a 
policy which accepts the likelihood of an adverse future but focuses on quick recovery 
(Chandler, 2014); again, aiming at static robustness that targets at reduction of adverse 
impacts across a range of possible range of conditions or adopting a model of dynamic 
robustness that allows policy/plan to change over time as the conditions change and new 
knowledge emerges.  




Figure 6: Approaches for developing adaptive policies (Walker et al, 2013) 
 
  
Adopting any of the strategies outside of ‗dynamic robustness‘ or ‗adaptive policy-
making‖ in a context of high uncertainty is likely to result in policy failure. Policies that are 
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rigid or less flexible and cannot incorporate elements of change in their design or 
implementation run the very great risk of not meeting their end objectives.  
 
Operationalizing the Concept: What Does Adaptive Policy and Policy-Making Look like 
So there is a need for policies to be ‗adaptive‘ under conditions of change (Swanson 
et al 2010). But how this is to be accomplished and what does an adaptive policy look like?  
While the concept of designing policies to be robust or to function effectively under a 
set of plausible futures, and to be adaptive or flexible with changing conditions is considered 
desirable in principle, there are many challenges in operationalizing such adaptive policies. 
Drawing a parallel between evolutionary biology and policies for sustainable development 
(both operating under conditions of change) Rammel and van der Bergh (2003) argue that 
―every successful adaptation is only a temporary ‗solution‘‖ to changing conditions and that 




Swanson and Bhadwal (2009) suggest seven tools that can help policies to deal 
effectively with anticipated and unanticipated conditions. This includes: 
 Integrated and forward-looking analysis involves identifying key factors that affect 
policy performance and developing scenarios depicting the likely ways in which these 
factors may evolve in the future. This tool can help develop indicators that can further 
trigger necessary policy adjustments in response to changes in these factors. 
 
 Multi-stakeholder deliberation refers to a collaborative effort by multiple actors to 
assess policy issues and plausible solutions, prior to taking a decision and afterwards. 
 
 Automatic policy adjustment: Anticipated variability in socio-economic and 
ecologic conditions under which a policy must operate can help fix certain ‗signposts‘ 
that can be monitored to help stimulate policy adjustments. 
 
 Enabling self-organization and social networks ensures that the policies upkeep 
existing social capital and facilitate social networking, learning and sharing of good 
practices to support the ability of actors to effectively respond to unanticipated future 
conditions. 
 
 Decentralization of decision-making empowers the lowest level of governance for 




 Promoting Variation: envisages creating a variety of policy responses or a policy 
mix in response to the same policy issue in order to increase the chances of achieving 
effective outcomes under uncertainty. 
 
 Formal policy review and continuous learning: refers to a regular review process 
put in place and conducted even when the policy is functioning well. 
 
 
Adaptive policies can be passive: operating on available ‗best‘ scientific information 
till new knowledge comes up; or active: consciously experimenting with policy alternatives 
to identify better strategies as new conditions emerge (Walter, 1992). Considering adaption as 
a process in case errors in policy design are discovered during the policy implementation 
stage, it is the political actors who are essentially entrusted with policy ‗correction‘. Here, the 
political actors operate as ―continuous policy-fixers‖ (Ingraham, 1987) and the functions of 
policymakers can be seen to oscillate between that of a policy ‗architect‘, ‗facilitator‘ and 
‗learner‘ in the policy process to appropriately ‗adjust‘ the policies in response to changing 
conditions over time (Swanson and Bhadwal, 2009). Evaluation findings can refine or 





Conclusion: Overcoming Failure Through Adaptive Policies 
This paper provides a discussion the implications of uncertainty for policy designs 
and designers. It distinguishes between uncertainty and ambiguity and the different levels of 
uncertainty that flow from these two different aspects of the issue. The possibility of 
designing and enacting policies that are able to adapt to a range of anticipated and 
unanticipated conditions has received much attention in the past decade as a useful 
proposition to avoid policy failure under condition of ‗deep uncertainty‘.  
First and foremost, the concept of adaptive policies has introduced the notion of 
planning for ‗alternate futures‘ which marks a deviation from the traditional static policy 
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planning. The common objective of all such approaches is to avoid policy failure and aid 
policies to continue functioning effectively in achieving their objectives over the long-term. 
By deploying various approaches suggested for dealing with static and dynamic futures 
policymakers accept the ―irreducible character‖ of future uncertainties (Walker et al, 2013) 
and the inevitable failure of static policies in a dynamic environment. 
This is by no means an automatic or easy process, however. For long-term policies 
that address complex and dynamic policy problems there is a need for constant monitoring 
and evaluation to ascertain if the policies are still continuing to meet their intended goals and 
objectives (Ramjerdi and Fearnley, 2013). In practice, adaptive policies are those which 
allow for the integration of new knowledge to adapt policies and prepare institutions for long-
term changes through continuous anticipation, evaluation and learning‘ (Volkery and Ribiero 
2009). Thus learning is a key feature of adaptive policymaking but one which faces many 
challenges and limitations. Policymakers operate across a range of uncertainties and 
addressing deep uncertainty may not always be an immediate priority in terms of undertaking 
action. There are also challenges in communication of uncertainty for policy design (Da 
Costa et al, 2008) and challenges in terms of the availability of resources needed to conduct 
relevant analysis and justify the need to deploy additional resources to plan for ‗unknown 
unknowns‘. In many developing or least developed country contexts where resources and 
institutional capacities maybe already limited and often earmarked for specific activities this 
is an especially vexing problem which must be overcome (Bisaro 2010).  
 
Endnotes
                                                     
1
 A policy model may also contain a variety of other types of quantities playing different roles within the 
analysis, including constants for e.g. fundamental physical constants), decision variables over which decision-
makers exert direct control e.g. environmental standards, value parameters based on preferences of stakeholders 
for e.g. discount rate, index variables marking the temporal and spatial boundaries of a model, model domain 
parameters and variables used to rank or measure likely outcomes. 
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2
 Schrader et al further suggest two levels of ambiguity, where the variables are given but not their functional 
relationships and where the variables and their functional relationships both are unknown as Level 1 and Level 2 
of ambiguity respectively. 
3
 Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) similarly present a classification of uncertainty focused on the interaction among 
actors and knowledge (or information)-related uncertainty for solving complex policy problems. Some of these 
uncertainties overlap with the empirical quantities identified by Morgan and Henrion, for example decision 
variables and value parameters and related uncertainties, and includes: 
(1) Substantive uncertainty that relates to lack of relevant information related to the nature of the complex 
problem, and the different interpretations of information arising from different ‗frames of reference‘ of the 
social actors and  
(2) Strategic uncertainty arises due to unpredictability of strategies deployed by different actors based on their 
perception of the problem and strategies likely to be deployed by other actors.  
Institutional uncertainty arises owing to the complexity of interaction of different actors guided by institutional 
frameworks i.e. rules and procedures of the organizations they represent. 
4
 Maxim and van der Sluijs, 2011 argue that most of these typologies are largely biased towards the ‗producer‘ 
of information and ignore uncertainty related to process and communication between producer and the end-user 
i.e. the decision-maker. To counter this drawback they developed a ‗knowledge lifecycle‘ to capture the 
different dimensions along which knowledge is produced and utilized. The knowledge lifecycle consists of 
framing of the problem, production and communication of knowledge relevant to the policy problem.  
Other types of uncertainties relevant for policymaking can relate to ‗qualification of knowledge base‘ which 
refers to the evidential support for the results, and the ‗value-ladenness‘ of policy choices, which includes actor 
perspectives, the knowledge and information being utilized for decision-making, the presentation of results etc. 
(Mathijssen et al, 2008).  In tracing how uncertainty has been considered by policy scholars moving from the 
modern to post-modern era in the context of policy analysis and application, Bredenhoff-Bijlsma (2010) 
highlights that while modernism focused on the ‗positivist‘ notion of using objective knowledge for policy 
analysis, post-modernism drew a focus on ―socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge‖ emphasizing on 
the role of actor interactions (an idea central to network theory). Network theory considers uncertainty to be an 
inherent aspect of actor interaction, owing to diverse interests, positions and preferences underlying the behavior 
of the actors (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).  
5
 An incomplete understanding of the system may result in solutions that are ineffective or even counter-
productive to the intended policy objectives (Kwadijk et al 2010). In the specific case of strategies designed to 
reduce the vulnerability to climate risks, for example, policies that do not consider the existence of diversity of 
risks, impacts and responses in a system can end up as ‗policy misfits‘ (Bunce et al 2010) or may become 
‗maladaptive‘ as they increase risks in the long-run (Barnett and O‘Niell 2011). 
6 Adaptation Tipping Points is a static approach that helps identify the conditions and time frame beyond which 
current policies/plans do not continue to function effectively. Adaptation Pathways that is an extension of the 
Adaptation Tipping Point approach by generating an alternate route for continuation of the policy/plan in a new 
form to achieve the initial intended objectives. Dynamic Adaptive Policy Pathways that combines the 
Adaptation Pathways and Adaptive Policymaking to identify alternative options over time across a range of 
plausible futures (Walker et al 2013). 
7
 The discussion of adaptive policies is also pertinent to issues that can face natural variations such as 
management of fisheries which are prone to natural cyclical patterns as well as uncertainty related to harvesting. 
In recent years, the idea of adaptive policies has been discussed widely in the context of decisions for long-term 
infrastructure planning and climate change (Buurman et al. 2009; Giordano, 2012; Gersonius et al, 2013; Ranger 
et al, 2013). These studies explore the impacts of climate change and long-lived infrastructure and the influence 
of uncertainties on infrastructure policies and plans and highlight the importance of introducing flexibility and 
adaptiveness from the initial stage of planning itself (Giordano, 2012). The adaptive policy approach can also be 
applied in case of trans-boundary air pollution, which is a complex policy issue with uncertainties related to the 
long range forecasting of emissions, economic costs of abatement and political concerns (Kelly and Volleburgh, 
2012).  
8
 Van der Pas et al (2012) draw attention to evaluation of adaptive policymaking which could differ based on the 
criteria for evaluation- the plan itself, the process of drafting the plan and/or the product i.e. the outcomes of the 
plan.  They also conducted a workshop on gathering expert opinion on implementation of adaptive policies by 
the Dutch national government. The results indicated that using adaptive policymaking is likely to increase the 
chances that policies realize their intended goals in the future. The experts also brought attention to institutional 
challenges in actually implementing these policies, primarily owing to the increased costs and time-
intensiveness of adaptive policies compared to ‗traditional static approaches‘, making it difficult for policy 
practitioners to justify them in the present date, even though the benefits might offset the costs in the long-run. 
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The experts also cautioned against the complex nature of the adaptive policy product, which may be difficult for 
a policymaker to present or defend, thus making its uptake and usability rather limited as compared to 
conventional straightforward policy planning approaches. Additionally, changes suggested to the original 
policies/ plans in the process of being robust and adaptive might require the original policy design to be altered 
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